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VIOLATING THE INVIOLATE: CAPS ON
DAMAGES AND THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

Robert S. Peck*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The false belief that juries seek to redistribute wealth through
verdicts that demonstrate little regard for a lawsuit’s merits, coupled with
the idea that complicit judges refuse to restrain those juries, comprise the
processional music of the tort reform movement.1 Notwithstanding the
discordant notes that reality strikes against this misleading cacophony,2 the
movement’s well-heeled patrons have grown so entranced by its rhythms
and so insatiable in their appetite for more that they have spawned a selfperpetuating industry of lobbyists and publicists, who have, in turn, built a
highly lucrative livelihood unimaginable in pursuit of any other concept so
bankrupt of empirical support, so fanciful in its claims, and so reliant on
both fictional anecdotes3 and the occasionally aberrant verdict, which, the
public is not told will be reduced through normal processes.4 Accompanied

_______________________________________________________
* Robert S. Peck is president of the Center for Constitutional Litigation, P.C. and an adjunct professor of
constitutional law at the law schools of American University and George Washington University . He
was counsel and successfully argued State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715
N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999) in the Ohio Supreme Court.
1
See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It Has Had is Between People’s Ears:” Tort
Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 453, 453-54 (2000) (describing tort
reform’s false vision of civil litigation as too many lawsuits resulting in skyrocketing awards that are
capriciously awarded in a wasteful and inefficient system that punishes deep-pocket defendants at a
heavy cost to society); see also William Haltom & Michael McCann, Distorting the Law: Politics,
Media and the Litigation Crisis (U. of Chi. Press 2004) (discussing the factors that have fueled a
misguided popular belief that the litigation system is out of control when the empirical data demonstrates
otherwise).
2
Professor Valerie Hans has tested the deep pockets theory that businesses are punished by juries merely
because of their wealth and found it wanting. See Valerie P. Hans, Business on Trial: The Civil Jury &
Corporate Responsibility (Yale U. Press 2000).
3
Professor Marc Galanter of the University of Wisconsin Law School has repeatedly chronicled the farfetched claims and fractured anecdotes that fuel the tort reform movement. See e.g. Marc Galanter, An
Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends about the Civil Justice System, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 717 (1998);
Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 Md. L. Rev. 1093 (1996); Marc Galanter,
News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 Denver U. L. Rev. 77 (1993); Marc
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Md. L. Rev. 3 (1986).
4
Remittitur, a new trial, and appeal provide some of the means through which jury verdicts may be
legitimately reduced. See generally Fleming James, Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of
Verdicts, 1 Duq. L. Rev. 143 (1963). Still complaining about the jury system supported by weak
anecdotal evidence of outlier verdicts is a longstanding tradition among those who would destroy the tort
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by a political and financial divide5 that makes the battle more imperative and
by a political environment in which facts matter so little,6 the tort reform
movement has flourished, despite its irrationality and its nonsensical
approach to law. Ohio’s recent enactment of two different statutes,7 both of
which flout recent binding precedent that establishes the unconstitutionality
of many of its provisions,8 is merely another chapter in a continuing saga

system. In a treatise on the jury first published in 1852, historian William Forsyth wrote, “It would not
be difficult for an opponent of the system to cite ludicrous examples of foolish verdicts, but they would
be a very unfair sample of the average quality; and nothing can be more unsafe than to make exceptional
cases the basis of legislation.” William Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 376 (James Appleton Morgan
ed., B. Franklin 1971).
5
The two major political parties have largely lined up on opposite sides of the tort reform debate. For
example, the 2004 Republican Party Platform advocated tort reform and directed considerable venom at
plaintiffs’ trial lawyers for supposedly bringing frivolous lawsuits to enrich themselves at the expense of
business. It further accused the 2004 Democratic presidential ticket of being beholden to those trial
lawyers and thus incapable of addressing the so-called litigation crisis. 2004 Republican Party Platform:
A Safer World and a More Hopeful America, at 43,
http://www.gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf (accessed Dec. 30, 2005). Political giving patterns appear
to reinforce this Republican/Democratic dichotomy. The Center for Responsive Politics reveals that, for
the 2005-06 election cycle, the top business political action committees (PAC), representing industries
who generally fight for tort reform, contributed to Republicans over Democrats by an average of sixtynine percent to thirty-one percent, while the PAC of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the
major national opponent of tort reform, favored Democrats by ninety-five percent to four percent margin.
See Center for Responsive Politics, Top 20 Contributors to Federal Candidates, 2005-2006,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/topacs.asp?txt=A&Cycle=2006 (accessed Dec. 30, 2005).
6
See Paul Krugman, Karl Rove’s America, N.Y. Times A19 (July 15, 2005) (explaining that we no
longer live in a world “where even partisans sometimes changed their views when faced with the facts”).
The political phenomenon in which facts matter less than the desired policy result is, of course, hardly a
new one. Still, it appears that rather than be the exceptional event it once was, it has become politics as
usual.
7
Amend. Substitute Sen. Bill 80 was signed into law by the Governor on January 7, 2005 and went into
effect on April 7, 2005. Amend. Substitute Sen. Bill 281 was signed into law by the Governor on
January 10, 2003 and was effective April 11, 2003. Both enactments contain, inter alia, limits on
compensatory damages for noneconomic loss.
8
See e.g. Crowe v. Owens Corning Fiberglas, 718 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio 1999) (per curiam) (holding
punitive damages cap unconstitutional); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Tr. Laws. v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d
1062 (Ohio 1999) (holding omnibus tort reform statute that, inter alia, included caps on noneconomic
damages and punitive damages unconstitutional); Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio 1994)
(finding deduction of collateral benefits from jury award violates right to trial by jury, due process, equal
protection, and right to a remedy); Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio 1994), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 809 (1995) (assigning determination of punitive damages to court violates right to trial
by jury); Galayda v. Lake Hosp. Systems, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 298 (Ohio 1994), cert. denied sub. nom.
Damian v. Galayda, 516 U.S. 810 (1995) (finding law requiring that future damages in medical
malpractice cases be paid periodically rather than as a lump sum violates right to trial by jury and due
process); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991) (finding $200,000 cap on general damages in
medical malpractice cases violates due process); Pryor v. Webber, 263 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio 1970) (holding
evidence of compensation from collateral sources to diminish damages prejudicial to jury determination);
Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Reg. Transit Auth., 1994 WL 78468 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. 1994), rev’d on
other grounds, 662 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1996) (holding $250,000 noneconomic damage limit violated jury
trial and equal protection rights); Samuels v. Coil Bar Corp., 579 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1991)
(finding collateral source offset in wrongful death actions violates jury trial, due process, equal
protection, and remedy rights); Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp., 495 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio Com. Pleas.
1985) (holding wrongful death cap unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds); Simon
v. St. Elizabeth Med. Cntr., 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1976) (finding damage cap violates equal
protection); Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1976) (finding collateral source
deduction violates equal protection).
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that shows no end.9
This article focuses on the centerpiece of these two new enactments:
caps on noneconomic damages,10 an idea that forms the sine qua non of the
tort reform movement.11 With a bravado that is belied by actual experience,
cap supporters make naked and unsupportable claims that capping
noneconomic damages will cut insurance premiums,12 increase product
development,13 deter frivolous lawsuits,14 stem the flow of doctors from
states,15 and reduce wasteful reliance on defensive medicine.16 Recently, the

_______________________________________________________
9
Professor Stephen J. Werber has detailed the ongoing warfare between a pro-tort reform Ohio
legislature and a state supreme court that has repeatedly struck down enacted measures in a series of
articles. See Stephen J. Werber, Ohio: A Microcosm of Tort Reform Versus State Constitutional
Mandates, 32 Rutgers L.J. 1045 (2001); Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform in 1998: The War
Continues, 45 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 539 (1997); Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform Versus the Ohio
Constitution, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 1155, 1199-200 (1996). The last time provisions like these were
reenacted after being declared unconstitutional the Ohio Supreme Court characterized the Legislature’s
actions as an “[a]ttack on the [j]udiciary as a [c]oordinate [b]ranch of [g]overnment.” Sheward, 715
N.E.2d at 1071.
10
Ohio’s definition of noneconomic damages is typical. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2323.43(H)(3)
(Anderson 2005). Ohio Revised Code § 2323.43(H)(3) defines noneconomic damages as “nonpecuniary
harm that results from an injury, death, or loss to person or property . . . including, but not limited to,
pain and suffering, loss of society, consortium, companionship, care, assistance, attention, protection,
advice, guidance, counsel, instruction, training, or education, disfigurement, mental anguish, and any
other intangible loss.”
11
See e.g. Richard E. Anderson, The Case for Legal Reform, in Medical Malpractice: A Physician’s
Sourcebook 201, 214-23 (Richard E. Anderson ed., Humana Press 2004) (identifying a $250,000 cap on
noneconomic damages as the most important reform); Robert S. Peck & Ned Miltenberg, Challenging
the Constitutionality of Tort ‘Reform’, in ATLA's Litigating Tort Cases § 29:20 (Roxanne Barton Conlin
& Gregory S. Cusimano eds., ATLA Press 2004).
12
See Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53
Emory L.J. 1263, 1271-72 (2004) (concluding that given the available empirical data refuting the claim,
“it is hard to understand why the interest groups clamoring for tort reform have been so successful in
convincing legislatures that limiting damages for the few negligently injured people whose cases go to
trial, win, and recover more in noneconomic damages than the amount of a damages cap, will alleviate
the periodic cycles that afflict the liability insurance markets”).
13
See The American Assembly, Tort Law and the Public Interest: Competition, Innovation and
Consumer Welfare 37-38 (Peter H. Schuck ed., Norton 1991) (reporting that claims that tort liability has
harmed product development and innovation are extravagant at best and hard to justify given how few
people who are injured actually sue).
14
See Daniel J. Capra, “An Accident and a Dream:” Problems with the Latest Attack on the Civil Justice
System, 20 Pace L. Rev. 339 (2000) (investigating the claim of a frivolous lawsuit crisis and finding it
wanting).
15
See Govt. Acctg. Off., Medical Malpractice: Implications of Rising Premiums on Access to Health
Care, 10 GAO-03-836 (Aug. 2003) (reporting that claims by doctors’ organizations and the news media
that physicians were moving out of states experiencing the high insurance premium increases in the
absence of damage caps “were not accurate or involved relatively few physicians”); Robert S. Peck, The
Great Disappearing Doctor Hoax, 1-5 Mealey's Tort Ref. Update 19 (Dec. 2003) (summarizing the
empirical evidence that neither affordability nor availability of health care was adversely affected by
medical malpractice litigation); Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice
Liability on the Delivery of Health Care, NBER Working Paper No. 10709 (Aug. 2004) (finding that
malpractice payments made on behalf of physicians do not drive increases in premiums, do not seem to
affect the overall size of the physician workforce, and do not result in increases in use of treatments as
defensive medicine).
16
See Perry Beider and Stuart Hagen, Limiting Tort Liability for Medical Malpractice (CBO Jan. 8,
2004) (available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4968&sequence=0) (accessed Jan. 22,
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Wisconsin Supreme Court exhaustively examined the available empirical
data and found that caps do not have a measurable impact on medical
malpractice insurance premiums,17 do not positively affect the size of the
physician population and the availability of health care,18 “have no effect on
a consumer’s health care costs,”19 and would not reduce the costly practice
of defensive medicine.20 The Court concluded that the legislature’s
“rationales [were] so broad and speculative” that they could not support the
constitutionality of the cap, which operated to the particular detriment of the
most severely injured medical malpractice victims.21
Wisconsin’s Supreme Court is not the only court that has struck
down noneconomic damage caps after finding that the illogical and
irrational assumptions of the enacting legislature failed to satisfy even the
minimum scrutiny required to overcome constitutional challenges under
state equal protection and due process guarantees. At least eight states have
issued such a ruling.22 Other courts, however, have shied away from such a
perfectly appropriate examination of legislative assumptions23 and have
2005) (finding “no evidence that restrictions on tort liability reduce medical spending” and “no
statistically significant difference in per capita health care spending between states with and without
limits on malpractice torts”).
17
Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Compen. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 473 (Wis. 2005).
18
Id. at 487.
19
Id. at 485.
20
Id. at 489.
21
Id. at 490-91.
22
See Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Assn., 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991) (finding $400,000 noneconomic
damage cap in medical malpractice cases violates jury trial and equal protection guarantees); Wright v.
Central Du Page Hosp. Assn., 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976) (finding $500,000 cap unconstitutional as
denial of equal protection); Trovato v. DeVeau, 736 A.2d 1212 (N.H. 1999) (finding $50,000 cap on
wrongful death claims where no dependant relative survives violates right to a remedy and equal
protection); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991) (finding $875,000 limitation on
noneconomic damages recoverable in actions for personal injury violates equal protection); Carson v.
Mauer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (finding abrogation of collateral source rule and $250,000
noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice cases violate equal protection); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) (imposing $300,000 statutory limit on damages recoverable in medical
malpractice action and abrogating collateral source rule violated state and federal equal protection and
due process guarantees); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991) (finding $200,000 cap on general
damages in medical malpractice cases violates due process); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983)
(finding statute admitting evidence of collateral source payments in medical malpractice cases was
unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection rights); Knowles v. U.S., 544 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996)
(finding statute limiting medical malpractice compensatory damages to $1 million violated substantive
due process), superseded by statute, S.D. Codified Laws § 21-3-11.1 (1997); Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 466
(finding cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases violates equal protection).
23
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the majority of state supreme courts have found that legislative
findings are not immune from challenge. See e.g. Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464
(1981) (holding “parties challenging legislation under the Equal Protection Clause may introduce
evidence supporting their claim that it is irrational”). See also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Govt. PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 378 (2000) (finding “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial
scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the
justification raised”); Evans v. Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 632-633 (1996) (stating to survive rational
relationship review, a law must be grounded in sufficient factual context for Court to ascertain some
relation between the classification and the purpose it serves); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993)
(finding “even the standard of rationality as we so often have defined it must find some footing in the
realities of the subject addressed by the legislation”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(sustaining a facial challenge on due process grounds to a statute that regulated access to abortion
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instead deferred to legislative caprice.24
In addition to due process and equal protection arguments,
challengers have also succeeded in invalidating damage caps by asserting
other constitutional infirmities, including separation of powers,25 the right to
a remedy,26 and the single-subject rule.27 Despite the impressive array of
constitutional arguments that can be brought to the fore against damage
caps, the preeminent argument remains the constitutional right to a jury
trial.28 Caps on damages, particularly the variation on the theme recently
enacted in Ohio,29 invariably and inevitably conflict with the constitutional
jury-trial right.30 Most states express that right very strongly, but 38 states,
including Ohio, declare the right to trial by jury to be “inviolate.”31
This article will explain why damage caps and the constitutional
services on the basis of expert testimony on the effect of the law); Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 460; Chiles v.
St. Employees Attys. Guild, 734 So.2d 1030, 1034 (Fla. 1999) (stating legislative statements of policy and
fact do not “obviate the need for judicial scrutiny”); Kinney v. Kaiser-Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 322
N.E.2d 880, 883-84 (Ohio 1975).
24
See e.g. Judd ex rel. Montgomery v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135 (Utah 2004); Est. of Verba v. Ghaphery, 552
S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2001); In re Kirkland v. Blaine County Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho 2000).
25
See e.g. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1079; Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 680 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997); Sofie
v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
26
The right to remedy provision is sometimes called “access to courts” or “open courts” and is found in
the constitutions of 37 states. Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights,
Claims, and Defenses 347 n.11 (3d ed., 1996). For cases employing this provision to invalidate caps, see
e.g. Trovato v. DeVeau, 736 A.2d 1212 (N.H. 1999) (finding $50,000 cap on wrongful death claims
where no dependant relative survives violates right to a remedy and equal protection); Smith v. Dept. of
Ins., 507 So.2d 1080, 1089-89 (Fla. 1987) (per curiam) (finding $450,000 cap on noneconomic damages
recoverable in actions for personal injury violates access to courts and jury provisions); Boswell v.
Phoenix Newsps., 730 P.2d 186, 194-95 (Ariz. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987) (finding
retraction in lieu of damages in defamation actions violates state "open courts" provision).
27
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1062 (finding omnibus tort reform statute held unconstitutional as violation of
single-subject rule, among other grounds).
28
See e.g. Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999) (finding $500,000 cap on noneconomic
damages in personal injury and wrongful death actions violates jury trial right).
29
See infra § III.
30
Only Colorado and Louisiana fail to provide a constitutional right to a jury trial. See Kaitz v. Dist. Ct.,
650 P.2d 553, 554 (Colo. 1982); Duplantis v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Corp., 342 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (La.
Ct. App. 1977). The other states’ provisions can be found at Ala. Const. art. I, § 11; Alaska Const. art. I,
§ 16; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 23; Ark. Const. art. II, § 7; Cal. Const. art. I § 16; Conn. Const. art. I, § 19;
Del. Const. art. 1, § 4; Fla. Const. art. I, § 22; Ga. Const. art. I, § 1, ¶ 11; Haw. Const. art. I, § 13; Idaho
Const. art. I, § 7; Ill. Const. art. I, § 13; Ind. Const. art. I, § 20; Iowa Const. art. I § 9; Kan. Const., Bill of
Rights § 5; Ky. Const. § 242; Me. Const. art. I, § 20; Md. Const., Declaration of Rights art. 23; Mass.
Const. pt. I, art. 15; Mich. Const. art. I, § 14; Minn. Const. art. I, § 4; Miss. Const. art. III, § 31; Mo.
Const. art. I, § 22(a); Mont. Const. art. III, § 23; Neb. Const. art. I, § 6; Nev. Const. art. I, § 3; N.H.
Const. pt. I, art. 20; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 9; N.M. Const. art. II, § 12; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2; N.C. Const.
art. I, § 25; N.D. Const. art. I, § 13; Ohio Const. art. I, § 5; Okla. Const. art. II, § 19; Or. Const. art. VII, §
3; Pa. Const. art. I, § 6; R.I. Const. art. I, § 15; S.C. Const. art. I, § 14; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 6; Tenn.
Const. art. I, § 6; Tex. Const. art. I, § 15; Utah Const. art. I, § 10; Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 12; Va. Const. art.
I, § 11; Wash. Const. art. I, § 21; W. Va. Const. art. III, § 13; Wis. Const. art. I, § 5; Wyo. Const. art. I, §
9.
31
Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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guarantee of a jury trial are irreconcilable, with particular emphasis on Ohio
and the 2005 caps enacted in that state.
II.

THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IS INVIOLATE

The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution declares
that:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.32

Regardless of whether the object of concern is criminal or civil, the
right to trial by jury “is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental
reservation of power in our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures
the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury
trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”33 It is little wonder
then, that the jury guarantee is one of the “great ordinances of the
Constitution.”34 Because damage caps invade the fact-finding province of
the jury and constitute a form of reexamination by a means other than
recognized by the common law,35 there can be little doubt that a federal
damage cap would run afoul of the U.S. Constitution.
However, because the Supreme Court has not seen fit to incorporate
the guarantees of the Seventh Amendment within those rights embraced and
applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,36 cap challengers must
rely upon state constitutional jury-right guarantees. Like most states, rather
than copy the federal formulation, the Ohio Constitution flatly declares:
“The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate . . . .”37 Despite the differences
in phrasing of the various state and federal jury rights, the two appear to be

_______________________________________________________
32

U.S. Const. amend. VII.
Blakely v. Wash., 542 U.S. 296, 305-306 (2004) (referring to the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury).
34
Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
35
See infra § II(B)(2).
36
Most of the Bill of Rights has been applied to the States through the Incorporation Doctrine, which
holds that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause makes obligatory upon the states certain
fundamental rights. See e.g. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341(1963) (“[T]his Court has looked
to the fundamental nature of original Bill of Rights guarantees to decide whether the Fourteenth
Amendment makes them obligatory on the States.”). The Seventh Amendment, however, has not been
incorporated in this manner. See Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937), overruled in part by Wolf v.
Colo., 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92
(1875).
37
Ohio Const. art. I, § 5.
33

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol31/iss2/5

2006]

VIOLATING THE INVIOLATE

313

united by a common canon of construction: both the U.S. Supreme Court
and state supreme courts have taken a historical approach to construing the
right.38
A.

The Lessons of History

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote that a “page of
history is worth a volume of logic.”39 Courts apparently have taken that
dictum to heart with respect to the jury-trial right. The U.S. Supreme Court
has long held that the proper inquiry in a Seventh Amendment case is a
historical one: “Since Justice Story’s day, we have understood that ‘the right
of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English
common law when the [Seventh] Amendment was adopted.’”40 Similarly,
state courts regularly formulate the constitutional jury-trial inquiry in terms
of whether it applied to analogous common and statutory law extant at the
time the constitutional guarantee was adopted.41 Ohio does not depart from
this history-based formulation.42
Jury trials stretch back at least to ancient Greek times.43 The Magna
Carta provided a guarantee of a jury trial by asserting that neither
imprisonment, dispossession, banishment nor destruction of person or
property could occur “except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land.”44 This language in the Magna Carta was not new but

_______________________________________________________
38

See e.g. Bringe v. Collins, 335 A.2d 670, 676 (Md. 1975), application denied, 421 U.S. 983 (1975)
(holding “the Maryland Constitution, like the Seventh Amendment, guarantees a right to a jury trial in
actions at law, where historically there was a right to a jury trial”); see also N.C. St. B. v. Dumont, 286
S.E.2d 89 (N.C. 1982); Steiner v. Stein, 66 A.2d 719 (N.J. 1949); Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Richman,
338 N.W.2d 814, 817 (N.D. 1983).
39
N.Y. Trust Co. ex rel. Purdy v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). See also Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Common Law, 1 (Dover Publications 1991) (stating “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience”).
40
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (quoting Baltimore & Carolina
Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935)).
41
Unisys Corp. v. S.C. Budget and Control Bd. Div. of Gen. Servs. Info. Tech. Mgt. Off., 551 S.E.2d 263,
271 (S.C. 2001) (holding “[i]t is well-settled that art. I, § 14 [the jury-trial provision] secures the right to
a jury trial only in cases in which that right existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution in
1868”); Lakin, 987 P.2d at 468 (finding “whatever the right to a jury trial in a civil case meant in 1857
[the time of the Oregon Constitution’s adoption], it has the same meaning today”); Dept. of Revenue v.
Printing H., 644 So. 2d 498, 500 (Fla. 1994) (holding that the inviolate jury trial right preserved in the
Florida Constitution is the same as the right “enjoyed at the time this state’s first constitution became
effective in 1845”) (quoting In re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1986)).
42
See Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 510(holding a jury trial is guaranteed in “those causes of actions where the
right existed at common law at the time the Ohio Constitution was adopted”).
43
See James L. Coke, On Jury Trial, 1 Or. L. Rev. 177 (1922) (tracing history of jury trial to ancient
Athens), cited in Lakin, 987 P.2d at 468; see also Maximus A. Lesser, The Historical Development of
the Jury System 6-9 (1992); William Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 1-5 (1999 reprint) (1875). In the
Aeschylus’s play, Eumenides, the goddess of wisdom is credited with devising the jury system. Lloyd E.
Moore, The Jury: Tool of Kings, Palladium of Liberty 1 (2d ed. 1973).
44
Magna Carta § 39 (1215). See also Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday, 188 N.E. 1, 3 (Ohio 1933)
(recognizing the American constitutional right to trial by jury is derived from Magna Carta); William
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previously found in 12th century English lawbooks and 11th century
documents of the Holy Roman Empire.45 Since that time, no phrase in the
Magna Carta “has been cited more often as a guarantee of the liberties of the
citizen.”46 In fact, the concept of judgment by peers is “one of the oldest
principles of English law.”47
The Supreme Court has similarly acknowledged that “[t]he right of
trial by jury is of ancient origin, characterized by Blackstone as ‘the glory of
the English law’ and ‘the most transcendent privilege which any subject can
enjoy.’”48 Blackstone added, that it was “always so highly esteemed and
valued by the people, that no conquest, no change of government, could ever
prevail to abolish it.”49 State courts have expressed similar sentiments: The
guarantee of trial by jury in civil cases “has been regarded from the earliest
times as one of the safeguards of the liberties of the people and as one of the
essentials to the due administration of justice.”50 That celebrated observer
of American mores during the 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville, found
the jury an essential institution for American democracy, ascribing the
people’s “political good sense” to the “long use that they have made of the
jury in civil matters.”51
The veneration heaped on the jury-trial right helps explain why it
stands as an insuperable obstacle to tort reform. The right to trial by jury
was of extraordinary importance, not just in England, but in colonial
America as well. Virginia, for example, used juries for both civil and
criminal cases at least since 1624.52 Jury trials were guaranteed, as well, in
the 1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties.53
In 1744, the First Continental Congress asserted a right to trial by
jury.54 Unhappy experiences under British rule heightened the importance
of jury trials in the colonial mind. The issue perfectly blended diverse
colonial aspirations. The jury represented both the height of English liberty,
as well as a means by which colonists could resist royal oppression. The
Sharp McKechnie, Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great Charter of King John, 134-37 (2d ed., J.
Maclehose Glasgow and Sons 1914) (discussing the Anglo-Saxon origins of trial by jury).
45
Sources of Our Liberties: Documentary Origins of Individual Liberties in the United States
Constitution and Bill of Rights 5 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., rev. ed., Am. B. Found.
1978) [hereinafter Sources of Our Liberties].
46
Id.
47
Id. at 7.
48
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485 (1935).
49
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 350 (U. of Chi. Press 2002).
50
Chesson v. Kieckhefer Container Co., 26 S.E.2d 904, 906 (N.C. 1943).
51
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 126 (Hackett Publg. Co. Inc. 2000).
52
Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44 Hastings
L.J. 579, 592 (1993).
53
Massachusetts Body of Liberties ¶ 29 (1641) (“In all actions at law it shall be the libertie of the plantife
and defendant by mutual consent to choose whether they will be tried by the Bensh or by a Jurie, unlesse
it be where the law upon just reason hath otherwise determined.”) (reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties
supra n. 45, at 151).
54
Lakin, 987 P.2d at 468 n. 4.
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British evidently so feared the power of colonial juries that they employed
extraordinary devices to avoid them. They were aware that colonial culture
celebrated famous jury trials such as the acquittal of preacher William Penn
and parishioner William Mead, charged with unlawful assembly after being
locked out of their church in 1670;55 the acquittal of seven Anglican
bishops, charged with seditious libel for refusing to read the King’s
proclamation to their congregations in 1687;56 and the acquittal of printer
John Peter Zenger, charged with seditious libel for publishing a newspaper
critical of the colonial governor in 1735.57 The manner in which juries
vindicated fundamental liberties and rebelled against the authorities had a
profound effect on the American colonies.58
By the time it became necessary to break the political bond with
England and assert the rights of Englishmen, the denial of the jury-trial right
was high among colonial complaints. Chief Justice Rehnquist once
observed that interference with the right to a jury trial was “one of the
important grievances leading to the break with England.”59 Others have
given it even more emphasis, calling the “fight over jury rights” nothing less
than “the fight for American independence.”60
It is little wonder, then, that the Declaration of Independence
charged England, among other complaints, with “depriving us in many
cases, of the benefit of Trial by Jury.”61 The Declaration’s complaint

_______________________________________________________
55

The Trial of William Penn and William Mead, 22 Charles II, 6 Howell’s State Trials 951 (1670). Penn
was arrested for preaching to his congregation on Gracechurch Street after being locked out by the
authorities, while Mead was arrested for listening to Penn. When the jury returned a verdict not to the
liking of the London Lord Mayor, they were sent back to the jury room without food or drink and with
threats of physical harm. They nonetheless persisted in their verdicts, were fined for their efforts, and
imprisoned until they paid their fines. The decision to acquit Penn and Mead was a landmark for
religious liberty and an affirmation in colonial minds of the importance of juries. See Robert S. Peck,
The Bill of Rights and the Politics of Interpretation 85-87 (West 1992).
56
The Trial of the Seven Bishops, 12 Howell’s St. Trials 183 (1688). The bishops had refused to read a
declaration of King James II to their congregations as a matter of religious liberty. Ironically, the
declaration was about religious tolerance. A jury acquitted them. See Peck, supra n. 55, at 87-89.
57
James Alexander, A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger, Printer of the New
York Weekly Journal (Stanley Katz, ed., Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press 1972). Zenger was acquitted
by a jury for publishing a newspaper that engaged in vicious and satirical attacks on New York’s colonial
governor in a celebrated trial that advocated truth as a defense and stands as a landmark in press freedom.
See Peck, supra n. 55, at 102-07.
58
Perhaps the fate and experiences of John Wilkes was most influential in this regard. Wilkes, a member
of Parliament, published an attack on a peace treaty with France, only to be arrested, expelled from the
legislative body, and sentenced to exile. He returned and was reelected to Parliament repeatedly but not
seated and eventually imprisoned. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527-28 (1969). He
eventually prevailed on the political front and then in a civil action in which the legitimacy of an award
of punitive damages was established. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.B. 1763). The Supreme
Court has recognized that “Wilkes’ struggle and his ultimate victory had a significant impact in the
American colonies.” Powell, 395 U.S. at 530.
59
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60
Roscoe Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty 72 (Yale U. Press 1957).
61
Declaration of Independence [¶ 20] (1776).
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referred to experience under the 1765 Stamp Act, which was used to avoid
civil jury trials. The Act, purportedly a revenue measure, taxed newspapers,
pamphlets, college degrees, miscellaneous items, and, most importantly, the
types of legal documents that were needed to pursue cases in civil court,62
effectively closing those courts to the colonists.63 Admiralty courts, which
operated without juries, were given jurisdiction to enforce the act, precisely
because the British assumed juries would be sympathetic to the American
plight.64 In response, the Americans convened the Stamp Act Congress to
protest that “trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British
subject in these colonies.”65
In the aftermath of these colonial experiences and other similar
events highlighting the importance of juries in England, all of the new
American states guaranteed the right to trial by jury in civil cases upon
declaring independence. In fact, “[t]he right to trial by jury was probably
the only one universally secured by the first American state constitutions.”66
Typically, these constitutions declared the right to be sacred.67 Congress
also included the jury-trial right in the 1787 Northwest Ordinance,
guaranteeing the right to “trial by jury” and “judicial proceedings according
to the course of the common law” to the territories, which included Ohio.68
When the new federal Constitution, proposed in 1787, failed to
guarantee a civil jury-trial right, the oppositional Antifederalists had their
most salient argument against ratification: “One of the strongest objections
originally taken against the constitution of the United States, was the want
of an express provision securing the right of trial by jury in civil cases.”69
The outcry for a jury trial was a dramatic rebuttal to Alexander Hamilton’s
suggestion in Federalist No. 83 that the jury right did not belong in the
Constitution.70

_______________________________________________________
62

Sources of Our Liberties, supra n. 45, at 263.
Edmund S. Morgan & Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution 178-86 (N.C.
Press 1995).
64
Sources of Our Liberties, supra n. 45, at 263.
65
Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress 1765, ¶ 7, reproduced in Sources of Our Liberties, supra n. 45,
at 270.
66
Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History 281
(1960) (quoted in Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 341 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
67
See e.g. Va. Decl. of Rights § 11 (1776) (“the ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other and ought
to be held sacred”); Pa. Const. § XI (1776) (“parties have the right to trial by jury, which ought to be held
sacred”); N.C. Const. § XIV (1776) (“sacred and inviolable”); Del. Decl. of Rights § 13 (1776); Md.
Const. § III (1776); N.J. Const. art. XXII (1776); Ga. Const. art. XLI (1777); Mass. Const. art. XV
(1780); N.H. Const. art. I, § XX (1784).
68
Northwest Ordinance art. II (1797) (reproduced in Sources of Our Liberties, supra n. 45, at 395). See
also Kneisley v. Lattimer Stevens Co., 533 N.E.2d 743, 746 (Ohio 1988).
69
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 445 (1830). See also Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 83, 495
(Clinton Rossiter ed., New Am. Lib. 1961) (calling it the objection that has “met with most success”).
70
Id. At the same time Hamilton made this dismissive statement about the need to guarantee jury-trial
rights in the federal Constitution, he also acknowledged that the “friends and adversaries of the plan of
the convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or
63
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At the North Carolina ratification convention, for example, delegate
James M’Dowall declared, “What made the people revolt from Great
Britain? The trial by jury, that great safeguard of liberty, was taken away . .
. .”71 Only the promise of a bill of rights that included a jury-trial right
secured ratification of the Constitution.
As Justice Black has noted, “[o]f the seven States which, in ratifying
the Constitution, proposed amendments, six included proposals for the
preservation of jury trial in civil cases.”72 The Bill of Rights included what
is now the Seventh Amendment’s civil-jury right to assure, inter alia, that
corrupt or politically motivated legislators did not interfere with a jury’s
prerogatives.73
The Supreme Court has since recognized that the
“[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care.”74
Ohio’s first constitution in 1802 adopted the now-prevailing
formulation of the jury-trial right: “That the right of trial by jury shall be
inviolate.”75 When the state drafted a new constitution, largely to curb
legislative power and legislative collusion with corporate interests in
ransacking the public treasury,76 a strengthened and independent judiciary
was established77 and an “inviolate” right to trial by jury was reasserted.78
Ohio still operates under this 1851 charter.
In construing this right, the Ohio Supreme Court has noted that
“[f]or centuries it has been held that the right of trial by jury is a
fundamental constitutional right, a substantial right, and not a procedural
if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to
liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.” Id. at 499.
71
Quoted in Charles Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 Minn. L. Rev.
639, 683 (1973).
72
Galloway v. U.S., 319 U.S. 372, 399 n. 3 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting). Those states were
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. Id.
73
Wolfram, supra n. 71, 664-65.
74
Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486.
75
Ohio Const. art. VIII, § 8 (1802).
76
I Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the
State of Ohio, 1850-51, at 175 (1851; reprinted 1933) (remarks of Charles Reemelin) (arguing “[u]nder
the old Constitution, the legislature swallowed up all the rest of the government”); Id. vol. 2, at 87
(remarks of Benjamin Stanton) (arguing that, unless new principles restraining the General Assembly
were adopted, Ohio would experience the “subversion of all our freedom, for our General Assembly
might barter away one right and another, till every vestige of freedom, and all proper powers of our
[g]overnment, might be lost by an imprudent assumption of power”). As R.P. Ranney, later a justice of
the Ohio Supreme Court, complained at the convention, every possible business incorporated to take
advantage of the General Assembly’s largess for their needs. Id. vol. 1, at 370. See also Sheward, 715
N.E.2d at 1076-79 (discussing the developments that brought about the current Ohio Constitution).
77
Frederick Woodbridge, A History of Separation of Powers in Ohio: A Study in Administrative Law, 13
U. Cin. L. Rev. 191 (1939).
78
Ohio Const. art. I, § 5 (amended 1912).
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privilege.”79 It protects all aspects of the jury trial, both from legislative or
judicial usurpation.80
B. The Caps Affect Causes of Actions within the Jury-Trial Right
Without question, the jury-trial right was a preeminent and
fundamental constitutional guarantee from the very beginning of this nation.
Venerability, however, does not answer the question of whether a damage
cap necessarily violates the jury-trial right. To satisfy the historical test, two
elements must exist if tort reform-styled noneconomic damages caps are
violative of the right: 1) tort cases must have been a common-law action at
the time these constitutions containing the jury-trial were adopted;81 and 2)
the determination of damages must have been a factual determination made
by the jury at that time.82 The latter requirement reflects the understanding
that “trial by jury has been the accepted and approved method of
determining questions of disputed fact among English-speaking peoples for
more than 900 years . . . .”83
1.

Tort Cases Present Issues to Which the Right to a Jury Trial
Attaches

Indisputably, the jury-trial right applies with full force to the types
of tort actions that are the object of damage caps. Professor William Prosser
recognized long ago that torts do not yield to easy definition, but are
nonetheless distinguishable from rights created by equity.84 The distinction
is significant because cases that were tried under a court’s equity jurisdiction
were not entitled to a jury trial. For this reason, torts have always been
cognizable in common-law courts, but not courts of divorce, ecclesiastics,
probate, admiralty, or equity.85
In his 19th century treatise on torts, Professor William Hale wrote
that the law traditionally recognized three forms of common-law actions:

_______________________________________________________
79

Cleveland Ry. Co., 188 N.E. at 3. Accord Kneisley, 533 N.E.2d at 746.
Gibbs v. Girard, 102 N.E. 299, ¶ 2 of syllabus (1913). Under Ohio Supreme Court rules, only the
syllabus of a case has the controlling force of law; the majority opinion merely states the views of the
author. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of
Opinions: A Critique, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 313, 322-34 (1985).
81
Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 510 (citing Belding v. State ex rel. Heifner, 169 N.E. 301, ¶ 1 of the syllabus
(1929)). Compare Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1989) (“Although ‘the thrust
of the Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791,’ the Seventh Amendment
also applies to actions brought to enforce statutory rights that are analogous to common-law causes of
action ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily
heard by courts of equity or admiralty”) (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974)).
82
Zoppo, 644 N.E.2d at 401; compare e.g. Baltimore, 295 U.S. at 657.
83
McDowell v. Norfolk S. R.R.. Co., 120 S.E. 205, 207 (N.C. 1923).
84
William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts vol. 1, 1 n.1 (1971) (citing Lee, Torts and Delicts, 27 Yale L.J.
721, 723 (1918)). Cf. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise
Independent of Contract 2-3 (2d ed., Callaghan & Co. 1888).
85
William B. Hale, Handbook on the Law of Torts (West Pub. Co. 1896).
80
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real, personal and mixed.86 Real actions were lawsuits brought for the
specific recovery of real property and, by 1896, were “long time . . .
extinct.”87 Mixed actions were cases brought for the specific recovery of
real property as well as damages for injury to that property.88 Personal
actions were matters brought for the recovery of personal chattel, damage
from breach of contract, and damages for injury to person or property.89 By
this categorization, personal injuries were a form of action known as
“actions of trespass.”90
Dean Thomas Cooley’s influential treatise, first published in 1879,
defined trespass as “the unlawful disturbance by force of another’s
possession.”91 Cooley provided examples that confirm tort actions are
within the scope of actions of trespass. For example, he included as a
trespass the resulting case of one “injured by the throwing of a lighted squib
into a crowd . . . .”92 He cited as another example, an injury when a man
throws a log on a highway and hits the plaintiff.93
William Blackstone, who was treated as the oracle of the English
common law by early Americans,94 similarly defined “trespass in its largest
and most extensive sense” as “any transgression or offense against the law
of nature, of society, or of the country in which we live, whether it relates to
a man’s person or to his property.”95 Trespass was but one of the two writs
available; actions on the case being the other.96 The law of trespass came
about in the 13th century as a remedy for forcible wrongs, including breach
of the peace.97 It was the remedy for civil wrongs, whether that wrong was
committed against person, land or goods.98 An intentional act gave rise to
liability, even when no damage occurred.99 The most common form of
trespass was the tort of battery.100
The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that negligence and other

_______________________________________________________
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Id. at 12.
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 511 (2d ed., Callaghan & Co. 1888).
92
Id. at 514.
93
Id.
94
As the U.S. Supreme Court wrote, “Blackstone’s Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory exposition
of the common law of England. At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution . . . more copies of the work
had been sold in this country than in England, so that undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution were familiar with
it.” Schick v. U.S., 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904).
95
Blackstone, supra n. 49, at 208.
96
John G. Fleming, The Law of Torts 16 (3d ed., Law Book Co. of Australasia 1965).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 18.
100
Id. at 25.
87
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tort actions “evolved from the common-law action of trespass on the case,
and battery actions existed at common law at the time of the adoption of our
state Constitution.”101 As a result, Ohio courts have concluded that the right
to trial by jury extends to tort actions derived from common law.102 Other
state courts that have examined the question have concurred,103 as has the
U.S. Supreme Court.104
2.

The Determination of Damages Falls within the Jury’s
Prerogative

History demonstrates as well, that the determination of damages
constitutes a fact within the jury’s province to determine. The jury’s
preeminent role in the assessment of damages appears to have been settled
at least since the time of Lord Coke,105 the 17th century scholar and jurist
whose writings were “a lodestar” for American common lawyers106 and
whose reading of the Magna Carta had unparalleled influence on American
lawyers.107 In addition, William Blackstone’s famous Commentaries, the
definitive source for understanding the common law that preexisted
American constitution-writing,108 established that “the quantum of damages
sustained by [a plaintiff] . . . cannot be [ascertained] without the intervention
of a jury.”109
The jury’s authoritative role in assessing damages was established
as well by colonial practice. One incident notoriously well-known
throughout the colonies110 and a source of American allegiance to the jurytrial right, occurred when New York’s acting colonial governor arbitrarily
attempted to overrule a jury and reduce the damages awarded in a case
involving a politically-connected defendant. One Antifederalist said the
event inspired “a flame of patriotic and successful opposition, that will not

_______________________________________________________
101
Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 510. See also Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 778; Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d
717, 733 (Ohio 1986) (Douglas, J., concurring).
102
See e.g. Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 510; Kneisley, 533 N.E.2d at 746.
103
See e.g. Lakin, 987 P.2d 463; Condemarin v. U. Hosp., 775 P.2d 349, 364, 366 (Utah 1989); Sofie,
771 P.2d at 718-19; McClanahan v. Gibson, 756 S.W.2d 889, 889 (Ark. 1988); Beurklian v. Allen, 432
N.E.2d 707, 708 (Mass. 1982).
104
See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999) (citing Curtis
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1974)) (finding “the Seventh Amendment jury guarantee extends to
statutory claims unknown to the common law, so long as the claims can be said to ‘sound basically in
tort,’ and seek legal relief”).
105
Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 669, 675
(1918); see also Edward Coke, First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England § 155b (15th ed. 1794).
106
Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 712 n. 10 (1997).
107
Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th Anniversary of Lochner v. New York, 72 Tenn. L. Rev. 455, 477
(2005).
108
See supra n. 94.
109
Blackstone, supra n. 49, at 397.
110
Among those thought to be in attendance at the civil trial was future Chief Justice John Jay. Herbert
Alan Johnson, John Jay: Lawyer in a Time of Transition, 1764-1775, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1260, 1266
(1976).
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be easily forgotten.”111 The matter began in July 1763, when merchant
Waddell Cunningham drew a concealed sword, stabbed and beat rival
Thomas Forsey, disabling him for a period of 82 days.112 A criminal trial, in
January 1764, brought conviction and an inconsequential fine of £30 for
Cunningham.113 Subsequently, a civil trial resulted in the much more
substantial verdict of £1,500.114 After the court refused Cunningham’s
motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial, he unsuccessfully
appealed to the New York Supreme Court of the Judicature, which found
that he had identified no error below.115 Cunningham nonetheless persisted
and sought review of the verdict before New York’s governing council,
under a gubernatorial edict that gave the council jurisdiction over appeals
through a writ of error.116 Lieutenant Governor Cadwallader Colden,
serving as acting governor, took charge of the appeal. Colden took the
position that the council could review the evidence and overrule the jury’s
verdict.117
Colden’s announced view brought the unanimous opposition of the
New York Attorney General, John Tabor Kempe, chastised Colden,
bar.
reminded him that juries are the judges of facts and that writs of error
applied to matters of law alone.119 With the New York Supreme Court
refusing to permit the council to take up the appeal, Colden ordered the
justices to appear before the council. Chief Justice Daniel Horsmanden
defended the Court’s decision to deny the appeal, declaring that the “Trial
was Regular and Solemn; and conducted with the utmost fairness and
Deliberation.”120
Horsmanden noted that the only complaint that
Cunningham made was that the damages were excessive, “which did not
appear to the Court to be well founded; and the Trespass being very
atrocious, and the Proofs clear, the Court over-ruled the Motion.”121
118

The Chief Justice went on to assert that if a writ of error was
available against the amount of a jury’s verdict, it would “alter[] the
Ancient, and wholsome Laws of the Land,” namely the common law factfinding role of the jury.122 While judicial error was subject to such
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The Complete Anti-Federalist vol. 2, 149 (Herbert Storing ed., U. of Chi. Press 1981). See also
Wolfram, supra n. 71, 696 n. 141.
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Helen Hill Miller, The Case for Liberty 188 (U. of N. Carolina Press 1965).
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Id. at 190.
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118
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Miller, supra n. 112, at 193.
120
Id. at 196.
121
Id.
122
Id.

Published by eCommons, 2005

322

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

correction, he added, “in all these Removes, the Verdict of the Jurors suffers
no Re-Examination.”123 The Chief Justice’s explanation was widely
disseminated in newspapers and broadsides.124 It succeeded in convincing
the council to resist Colden’s approach, which caused him to complain that
the court then “must become uncontroulable. However agreable this may be
to Judges fond of Power, it must become terrible to the People under their
jurisdiction.”125
Cunningham then, with Colden’s support, petitioned the King for a
hearing.126 At the same time, the Stamp Act controversy was swirling
through the colonies. The New York Committee of Correspondence, that
approved the call for the Stamp Act Congress, included in its resolution an
acknowledgment of the Forsey v. Cunningham case as part of its protest:
[A]n illegal attempt had been made, during the late Recess,
to deprive the Inhabitants of this Colony of their antient and
undoubted Right of Trials by their Peers, by bringing an
Appeal from the Verdict of a Jury, in a cause between
Forsey and Cunningham.127
On October 9, Colden received royal authorization to convene the
council to take appeals “from verdicts of juries on questions of fact,”
generally and Cunningham’s appeal, specifically.128 The court nonetheless
persisted in defying the new order, because it could conceive of no legal
means by which an appeal could properly be taken, even after the King’s
order.129 The General Assembly passed a resolution supporting the court
and stated that “an appeal from the verdict of a jury is subversive of that
right [to trial by jury].”130
Although the incident was shaping up as a dramatic confrontation
between royal power and legal reason, the controversy fizzled out with the
appointment of a new governor and a dispatch from London declaring that,
after consultation with lawyers for the Crown, all appeals must again be
limited to review of judicial error.131
The developments in Forsey v. Cunningham secured for early
Americans the status of the jury as the proper assessors of damages and the
narrow role left to judges and appellate courts with respect to damages.
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Miller, supra n. 112, at 202.
124

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol31/iss2/5

2006]

VIOLATING THE INVIOLATE

323

Ever since, U.S. courts repeatedly recognized that the award of damages
was within the strict province and discretion of the jury. In fact, early on,
the U.S. Supreme Court followed the principles that animated Forsey. In
United States v. Laub,132 the Court declared it “a point too well-settled to be
drawn into question, that the effect and sufficiency of the evidence, are for
the consideration and determination of the jury; and the error is to be
redressed, if at all, by application to the court below for a new trial, and
cannot be made a ground of objection on a writ of error.”133 The only
interference permitted to a jury’s award of damages occurred when the
award was so excessive that the jury was motivated by passion or
prejudice.134 In 1822, Justice Joseph Story, sitting on circuit, described that
authority as consistent with common-law practices so that remittitur could
be ordered as long as the option of a new jury trial was also offered.135 For
authority, Story relied upon British Chief Justice Lord Ellenborough’s
decision in Chambers v. Caulfield,136 where he declared:
[I]f it appeared to us from the amount of the damages given
as compared with the facts of the case laid before the jury,
that the jury must have acted under the influence either of
undue motives, or some gross or misconception on the
subject, we should have thought it our duty to submit the
question to the consideration of a second jury.137
By 1886, the Supreme Court declared that “nothing is better settled
than that . . . [in] actions for torts where no precise rule of law fixes the
recoverable damages, it is the peculiar function of the jury to determine the
amount by their verdict.”138 The Court again relied on Justice Story to
define the scope of the jury’s authority:
Mr. Justice Story well expressed the rule on this subject that
a verdict will not be set aside in a case of tort for excessive
damages “unless the court can clearly see that the jury have
committed some very gross and palpable error, or have
acted under some improper bias, influence or prejudice, or
have totally mistaken the rules of law by which the damages

_______________________________________________________
132

37 U.S. 1 (1838).
Id. at 5.
134
Even today, courts use similar language to describe the rare occasions when the jury’s damage award
is properly subject to review. As the Supreme Court has noted, courts “use different verbal formulations,
[but] there may not be much practical difference between review that focuses on ‘passion and prejudice,’
‘gross excessiveness,’ or whether the verdict was ‘against the great weight of the evidence.’” Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 n. 10 (1994).
135
Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason, 102 (Cir. Ct. Mass. 1822) (Story, J.) (cited in Dimick, 293 U.S. at 482).
136
102 Eng. Rep. 1280 (K.B. 1805).
137
Id. at 1285.
138
Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886).
133
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are to be regulated,” – that is, “unless the verdict is so
excessive or outrageous,” with reference to all the
circumstances of the case, “as to demonstrate that the jury
have acted against the rules of law, or have suffered their
passions, their prejudices, or their perverse disregard of
justice to mislead them.” In no case is it permissible for the
court to substitute itself for the jury, and compel a
compliance on the part of the latter with its own view of the
facts in evidence, as the standard and measure of that
justice, which the jury itself is the appointed constitutional
tribunal to award.139
State courts in the 19th and early 20th century consistently took a
similar view.140 Expressed in remarkably similar language, modern courts
have also subscribed to the primacy of the jury in assessing damages. For
example, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently said:
Litigants have a constitutional right to have factual issues
resolved by the jury. This right embraces the determination
of damages when there is room for a reasonable difference
of opinion among fair-minded persons as to the amount that
should be awarded . . . . The amount of a damage award is
a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact, in
this case, the jury.141
An echo of that approach can be seen in other states.142 After
initially muddying the waters, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently clarified
its agreement as well. For years, tort reformers cited language in Tull v.
United States,143 for the proposition that the jury’s job did not extend to the
assessment of damages. Specifically, Tull stated that “[n]othing in the
[Seventh] Amendment’s language suggests that the right to a jury trial
extends to the remedy phase of a civil trial.”144 Reliance on that naked
statement, however, proved misplaced; particularly because the next
sentence states that “[i]nstead, the language ‘defines the kind of cases for

_______________________________________________________
139

Id. (citing Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. 934 (D. Me. 1843)) (emphasis added).
See e.g. Ward v. White, 9 S.E. 1021, 1023-24 (Va. 1889) (awarding damages within strict province
and discretion of jury); Tenn. Coal & R.R. Co. v. Roddy, 5 S.W. 286 (Tenn. 1887); Hulin v. W. Union
Telegraph Co., 117 S.E. 588, 590 (N.C. 1923).
141
Mather v. Griffin Hosp., 540 A.2d 666, 673 (Conn. 1998).
142
See e.g. Bunch v. King County Dept. of Youth Services, 116 P.3d 381, 389 (Wash. 2005) (citations
omitted) (“The jury is given the constitutional role to determine questions of fact, and the amount of
damages is a question of fact . . . . ‘The jury's role in determining noneconomic damages is perhaps even
more essential.’”); Tonik v. Apex Garages, Inc., 275 A.2d 296, 299 (Pa. 1971) (“The duty of assessing
damages is within the province of the jury and should not be interfered with by the court, unless it clearly
appears that the amount awarded resulted from caprice, prejudice, partiality, corruption or some other
improper influence.”); Flynn v. Vancil, 242 N.E.2d 237, 240 (Ill. 1968) (“The question of damages is
peculiarly one of fact for the jury.”).
143
481 U.S. 412 (1987).
144
Id. at 426 n.9.
140
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which jury trial is preserved, namely “suits at common law.”’”145
In fact, Tull stands for the unremarkable proposition that a
legislature that creates a previously unknown cause of action may set the
damages awardable in that action. Common law actions, however, continue
to receive an undiluted jury-trial right as it was practiced in 1791. In
reviewing that historic test, which was rehearsed earlier in this article,146 the
Supreme Court more recently declared that the jury was the judge of
damages in common-law actions in 1791 and thus remains the judge of
damages today.147 The Court’s clear holding in Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, Inc., establishes that the “right to a jury trial includes
the right to have a jury determine the amount of . . . damages.”148 In
Feltner, the Court unanimously found Tull to be inapposite for precisely the
proposition that tort reformers offered it,149 thereby restricting its application
to statutory actions without common-law antecedents. Applying the Feltner
principle in a subsequent decision, the Court took the Fourth Circuit to task
for ordering a remittitur without offering the plaintiff the option of a new
jury trial.150 These recent declarations leave little doubt that the jury’s
constitutional role includes the assessment of damages, a result that is not
subject to reexamination except on limited grounds, provided that any
remittitur can be refused in favor of a new jury trial.
A cap on noneconomic damages obviously offends the Feltner
principle. It overrides a jury’s verdict, which includes a determination of
the proper amount of noneconomic damages needed to compensate a
plaintiff based on the evidence presented at trial. Even when the trial judge
agrees with the jury’s determination, and thus the verdict is emphatically not
the product of passion or prejudice or any other improper consideration, a
cap exercises judicial authority that does not exist to revise the verdict
downward, rendering the jury’s verdict advisory, rather than constitutionally
secured.
Ohio jurisprudence mirrors these principles. Whether one looks at
early decisions about the right to trial by jury or more recent ones, the right
is properly treated as sacrosanct.
Just two years after the Ohio
Constitutional Convention, in which he played a prominent role and in
which he appeared to anticipate the present debate over damage caps,

_______________________________________________________
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Id.
See supra nn. 81-140 and accompanying text.
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998) (“if a party so demands, a
jury must determine the actual amount of . . . damages . . . in order ‘to preserve the substance of the
common-law right of trial by jury.’”).
148
Id. at 353.
149
Id. at 355.
150
Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208 (1998) (per curiam); compare e.g. Markota v. E. Ohio
Gas Co., 97 N.E.2d 13 (Ohio 1951).
146
147
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Justice R. P. Ranney wrote for the Ohio Supreme Court that “it is beyond
the power of the General Assembly to impair the right, [to trial by jury] or
materially change its character.”151 Well-established precedent also focuses
on the right as one of substance and not a mere question of procedure.152
The jury-trial right is subject to extension, but not abridgement.153
A cap on damages, however, impairs the right by taking over one of
the fact-finding responsibilities of the jury. In 1913, the Ohio Supreme
Court condemned fact-finding by the legislative body in a lawsuit, as “a
sinister and indirect invasion and usurpation of the right of trial by jury . . .
[and] clearly unconstitutional.”154 The determination of the damages to be
awarded in compensation constitutes one of the critical facts the jury must
determine.155
More recent judicial pronouncements accord with these venerable
precedents:
[I]t is axiomatic that the assessment of damages is
thoroughly and peculiarly within the province of the jury
which heard the testimony and appraised the witnesses as
the incidents giving rise to the injury unfolded before it, and
that such appraisal should not be disturbed, either upward or
downward, unless ‘their judgment appears to have been the
result of passion and prejudice . . .’, . . . or is such as ‘to
shock the sense of fairness and justice’ of the reviewing
court.156
Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court has noted that legislation is
invalid if it would permit a court to “enter judgments in disregard of the
jury’s verdict and thus violate the plaintiff’s right to have all facts
determined by the jury, including damages.”157
There cannot be any doubt that the overwhelming majority position,
fully embraced in Ohio jurisprudence, is that the determination of damages

_______________________________________________________
151

Work v. State, 2 Ohio St. 297, 306 (1853).
Cleveland Ry. Co., 188 N.E. at 1, ¶ 1 of syllabus.
153
Gunsaullus v. Pettit, 17 N.E. 231 (Ohio 1888).
154
Gibbs, 102 N.E. at 301; compare People v. Bigge, 297 N.W. 70, 76 (Mich. 1941) (holding “[t]he right
of trial by jury is too firmly established in American jurisprudence to allow it to be whittled away by the
legislature”).
155
The determination of noneconomic damages is a determination of what amount of compensation is
necessary to make the plaintiff whole for his or her injuries. It is a fundamental principle of tort law that
the purpose of a civil action is to make a plaintiff whole for his or her injuries. Fantozzi v. Sandusky
Cement Prod. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 482 (Ohio 1992) (identifying the make-whole requirement as a
fundamental principle of tort law).
156
Spicer v. Armco Steel Corp., 322 N.E.2d 279, 280 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. 1974) (per curiam) (citations
omitted).
157
Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 510; see also Zoppo, 644 N.E.2d at 401 (striking down as a violation of the
jury-trial right a legislative reassignment of the determination of punitive damages from the jury to the
judge).
152
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is a fact found by the jury and thus within the protection of the jury-trial
right. When a damages determination is appropriately subject to review,
that review is within the authority of only the trial judge, with the adverselyaffected party retaining the option of insisting on a new jury trial. In such a
regime, there is no room for legislative interference through a statute that
adopts a one-size-fits-all limitation on common-law damages.
III.

OHIO’S 2005 CAPS ON DAMAGES AND THE OHIO CONSTITUTION

Despite the certitude with which Ohio constitutional law in
particular views caps on damages as invalid, the Ohio legislature has
ventured into that thicket again, presumably hoping that a changed Supreme
Court membership would reject centuries of precedents to uphold the
caps.158 Two pieces of legislation that included caps on noneconomic
damages, were enacted, one oriented to medical malpractice and a second
applying to products liability and other torts. Neither law’s caps satisfy
constitutional requirements.
A.

Ohio’s Medical Malpractice Reform Unconstitutionally
Caps Damages

Amended Substitute Senate Bill 281, a bill to revise actions for
“medical, dental, optometric, and chiropractic claim[s],”159 went into effect
on April 11, 2003.160 Key components of the bill included:
•

Procedural requirements in medical, dental, optometric, or
chiropractic claims, requiring a court to determine, upon a
defendant’s motion, whether the action was brought in good
faith and award costs and attorneys’ fees if no reasonable good

_______________________________________________________
158
Winning the political race for seats on the Ohio Supreme Court has cheered some tort reform groups,
which look to those newly appointed justices to reverse the Court’s earlier holdings. See e.g. American
Tort Reform Association, Election 2004: A Win for Civil Justice Reform, http://www.atra.org/show/7836
(accessed Dec. 31, 2005); Institute for Legal Reform, Chamber Highlights Successful Pro-Business
Election
Effort,
Business
Drive
to
Get-out-the-Vote
behind
Election
Victories,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/newsroom/display_release110304.html (accessed Dec. 31,
2005). One commentator has also chronicled how the constitutional battle over tort reform fuels the
electoral battles over seats on the Ohio Supreme Court. See James T. O’Reilly, Writing Checks or
Righting Wrongs: Election Funding and the Tort Decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court, 51 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 643 (2004). Electoral victories of this type, which does not amend the state constitution, should not
change embedded principles as if they were the spoils of political wars. The Supreme Court has noted
that “[a] basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in [a court’s] membership invites
the popular misconception that this institution is little different from the two political branches of the
Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law
which it is our abiding mission to serve.” Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 864).
159
Amend. Substitute Sen. Bill 281, Ohio 124th Gen. Assembly (2003).
160
Ohio Legis. Serv. Commn., Final Bill Analysis of Ohio Amended Substitute Senate Bill 281, 124th
Gen. Assembly (Jan. 10, 2003), at 1 (2003)
http://lsc.state.oh.us/analyses/fnla124.nsf/All%20Bills%20and%20Resolutions/F0F77688D1FE5D1C852
56C9900517060 (accessed Nov. 5, 2005).
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faith basis is found;161
•

Limits noneconomic damages in such cases to the greater of
$250,000 or an amount equal to three times the plaintiff's
economic loss, to a maximum of $350,000 for each plaintiff or a
maximum of $500,000 for each occurrence; the limits rise to
$500,000 per plaintiff and $1 million per occurrence for
permanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use of a
limb, or loss of a bodily organ system, or for permanent
physical functional injury that permanently prevents the injured
person from being able to independently care for him- or herself
and perform life-sustaining activities;162

•

Regulates payment of future damages in excess of $50,000 so
that payments may be made periodically rather than in a lump
sum;163

•

Grants civil immunity to health care professionals engaged in
voluntary medical work;164

_______________________________________________________
161
Amend. Substitute Sen. Bill 281 at § 2323.42. The provision, which attempts to change civil
procedure in medical malpractice cases, runs afoul of the Ohio Constitution as violating separation of
powers. In Ohio, authority to promulgate rules of civil procedure are within the exclusive province of the
Ohio Supreme Court and are not shared with the legislature. Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5(B) (the “supreme
court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall
not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right” and “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be
of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”). The exclusive assignment of authority
to the Supreme Court is further reinforced by a provision denying the legislature any authority to exercise
judicial power. Ohio Const. art. II, § 32. The Ohio Supreme Court has twice invalidated a “certificate of
merit” requirement as a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit, which the legislature imposed on two different
occasions to accomplish the same purposes as the present requirement. See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at
1087; Hiatt v. S. Health Facilities, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 1994). The new provision in Amended
Substitute Senate Bill 281 appears to be aimed at a similar objective: to weed out weaker cases (or cases
dependant on discovery to succeed) at an early stage, an authority that is patently procedural and outside
legislative cognizance.
162
Amend. Substitute Sen. Bill 281 at § 2323.43. The constitutional infirmities of this provision are
discussed infra. As an apparent alternative attempt to enforce the damage limits, the bill also denies trial
courts jurisdiction to enter judgment on an award of noneconomic damages in excess of the limits it
establishes. Id. at § 2323.43(D)(1). This indirect attempt to cap damages is as offensive to the
Constitution as any direct attempt would be. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, it is a judicial power,
not a legislative one, to decide cases. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995)
(citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 926 (1990)). Rather
than limit one level of court from exercising jurisdiction, the provision denies any Ohio court the
authority to render a judgment with which the legislature disagrees.
163
Amend. Substitute Sen. Bill 281 at § 2323.55. A previous statutory requirement establishing periodic
payments for medical malpractice awards above $200,000 in future damages was struck down by the
Ohio Supreme Court on jury-trial grounds in Galayda, 644 N.E.2d 298, because it reduced the jury’s
award twice: once reasonably to present value and a second time through periodic payments that
devalued the award further.
164
Amend. Substitute. Sen. Bill 281 at § 2305.234. Article I, §16 of the Ohio Constitution declares that
“[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or
delay.” Ohio Const. art. I, § 16. The Ohio Supreme Court has authoritatively construed this guarantee to
assure that a plaintiff has “an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” to
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•

Permits the introduction of evidence of collateral sources so that
juries may deduct that amount from their awards;165

•

Regulates expert evidence in medical malpractice cases;166

The damage cap adopted in the legislation does not take it outside
existing Ohio precedent, which has consistently found caps violative of trial
by jury, among other constitutional objections.167 Under the new law’s
provisions, noneconomic damages cannot exceed $250,000 unless the
economic damages awarded are more than one-third that amount
($83,333.34).168 In that case, the noneconomic damage cap becomes three
times economic damages up to, but not exceeding, $350,000 per plaintiff or
$500,000 per occurrence.169 For certain catastrophic injuries, defined as
permanent and life-altering, the cap is moved up to $1,000,000 per plaintiff,
including derivative claims.170
Despite the complicated formulas adopted and the apparent
recognition that a single one-size-fits-all approach is, at a minimum, unfair,
the limitations still invade the jury’s province. The right of the jury to
assess damages is meaningless if their determination, based on the evidence
adduced before them, can be revised downward through a legislative
formula. After all, Ohio has long held that “[t]he right of trial by jury, being
guaranteed to all our citizens by the constitution of the state, cannot be
invaded or violated by either legislative act or judicial order or decree.”171
As did the abrogation of the collateral source rule struck down in
Sorrell, this cap unconstitutionally instructs courts to “enter judgments in
pursue legal recourse. Hardy v. VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626, 628 (Ohio 1987). Accord Gaines v.
Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709, 716 (Ohio 1987) (stating “[d]enial of a remedy and denial of a
meaningful remedy lead to the same result: an injured plaintiff without legal recourse”). The current
bill’s grant of immunity leads to precisely the result condemned by the Ohio Constitution.
165
Amend. Substitute Sen. Bill 281 at § 2323.41. A prior abrogation of the collateral source rule was
struck down on multiple constitutional grounds, including the right to trial by jury, in Sorrell,
633 N.E.2d 504.
166
Amend. Substitute Sen. Bill 281 at § 2743.43. Because the provision attempts to regulate evidence, it
runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s exclusive authority over the rules of evidence. See In re Coy, 616
N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (Ohio 1993) (holding it unconstitutional for the legislature to “change (enlarge) the
Evidence Rules as promulgated by this court”). Perhaps supporters of this provision thought it might
survive judicial review because it allows a trial court to override its exclusion if the expert evidence
would be probative. That concession to judicial authority, however lodges the decision in the trial court,
while the Ohio Constitution places the ultimate rulemaking authority in the Supreme Court. Ohio Const.
art. IV, § 5(b). The legislature may not choose where the assignment goes.
167
See e.g. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1092 n. 4.
168
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2323.43 (Anderson 2005).
169
Id. Thus, if an act of medical malpractice occurs in delivering a newborn and results in significant
injuries to mother and child that otherwise do not satisfy the law’s permanent physical deformity
exception, each would be limited to $250,000 in noneconomic damages because the injury would
constitute a single occurrence with a maximum cap of $500,000. If the baby’s father had a claim for loss
of consortium, this provision would actually provide less per plaintiff, requiring that the $500,000 cap be
divided three ways.
170
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2323.43(A)(3) (Anderson 2005).
171
Gibbs, 102 N.E. at 299, ¶ 2 of syllabus.
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disregard of the jury’s verdict and thus violate the plaintiff’s right to have all
facts determined by the jury, including damages.”172 The Sorrell Court was
critical of the effect of the legislative action, which it characterized as
“essentially grant[ing] the tortfeasor a rebate for the damages he caused.”173
Such a result defies logic, particularly because noneconomic damages are a
form of compensatory damages intended to make the plaintiff whole.174 In
fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “one of the hallmarks of
traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to
compensate the plaintiff ‘fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his
legal rights.’”175 These injuries may well include emotional distress and
pain and suffering.176 A cap, as the Ohio Supreme Court has acknowledged,
accomplishes quite the opposite “[i]t is irrational and arbitrary to impose the
cost of the intended benefit to the general public solely upon a class
consisting of those most severely injured by medical malpractice.”177
Although it was not a cap challenge, the Ohio Supreme Court had
occasion to look at interference with the jury’s authority to determine
damages in a case that successfully challenged the reassignment of punitive
damage determinations from the jury to the judge.178 There, the Court found
that the statute “impairs the traditional function of the jury in determining
the appropriate amount of damages . . .” and thus violates the right to a jury
trial.179 Applying this precedent to the most recent prior attempt by the
legislature to cap noneconomic damages, the Court found that no amount of
prestidigitation could allow the legislature to substitute its determination for
the jury. Instead, the use of indirection that was intended to mask its
reexamination of the jury’s verdict merely “create[d] the illusion of
compliance by permitting the jury to assess the amount of . . . damages to be
awarded, but requiring the court to nullify the jury’s determination and
substitute the will of the General Assembly in any case where a jury awards
. . . damages in excess of the amounts specified.”180 The Court added:
The [jury-trial] right belongs to the litigant, not the jury, and
a statute that allows the jury to determine the amount of . . .
damages to be awarded but denies the litigant the benefit of
that determination stands on no better constitutional footing
than one that precludes the jury from making the

_______________________________________________________
172

633 N.E.2d at 510.
Id.
Fantozzi, 597 N.E.2d at 482.
175
U. S. v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 (1992) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978)).
176
Id.
177
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1092 (quoting with approval Nervo v. Pritchard, No. CA-6560 (Ohio App.
5th Dist. 1985)).
178
Zoppo, 644 N.E.2d at 401.
179
Id.
180
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1091 (referring to a punitive damage cap but equally applicable to a
noneconomic damage cap).
173
174
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determination in the first instance.181
The new medical malpractice cap, thus, deserves the fate of
previous efforts: invalidation.
B.

Ohio’s General Tort Reform Unconstitutionally Caps
Damages

In 2005, the Ohio General Assembly enacted a new general tort
reform measure.182 Like the medical malpractice bill, it contained a number
of provisions that had previously been declared unconstitutional, including:
•

Limits on noneconomic damages;183

•

Abrogation of the collateral source rule;184

•

Limits on the amount of punitive damages recoverable, setting
up different standards for large employers and small
employers,185 as well as other provisions limiting the instances
in which punitive damages may be awarded.186

The noneconomic damage caps enacted in Amended Substitute
Senate Bill 80 follow a similar pattern to those established in the medical
malpractice bill. The caps generally limit noneconomic damages to the
greater of $250,000 or an amount equal to three times economic damages
with a revised ceiling of $350,000 per plaintiff or $500,000 per
occurrence.187 The legislation sets no limitations for certain permanent
physical injuries.188 If the catastrophically injured party’s life expectancy is
67 years or more after the incident, the cap is calculated by multiplying that
number of years by $15,000.189 In passing this provision, the General
Assembly reenacted a less generous version of a previous law that was

_______________________________________________________
181

Id.
Amend. Substitute Sen. Bill 80, Ohio 125th Gen. Assembly (2005).
183
Id. at § 2315.18. The specific limitations and procedures governing noneconomic damages will be
discussed infra.
184
Id. at § 2315.20. See supra n. 165 regarding a previous invalidation of similar earlier legislation.
185
Amend. Substitute Sen. Bill 80 at § 2315.21. A previous cap on punitive damages was invalidated in
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1092-93.
186
Among those provisions further inhibiting the award of punitive damages, Amended Substitute Senate
Bill 80 establishes a government standards defense for manufacturers of medical devices and over-thecounter drugs, as well as manufacturers and suppliers of certain other products. Amend. Substitute Sen.
Bill 80 at §§ 2307.80(C)-(D). It also prohibits multiple punitive damage awards where an award of
punitive damages has already been imposed and paid based on the same act or course of conduct. Id. at §
2315.21(D)(5)(a). The myriad constitutional problems with those provisions are beyond the scope of the
article.
187
Id. at § 2315.18(B)(2).
188
Id. at § 2315.18(B)(3).
189
Id. at § 2315.18(8)(B)(2).
182
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struck down by the Ohio Supreme Court.190
To the extent this legislation follows the same regime with respect
to damages as Amended Substitute Senate Bill 281, its constitutional
infirmities duplicate those discussed earlier.191 However, the new bill adds a
new procedural twist that is separately and distinctly constitutionally infirm.
In its entirety, Section 2315.19 provides:
(A)(1) Upon a post-judgment motion, a trial court in a tort
action shall review the evidence supporting an award of
compensatory damages for noneconomic loss that the
defendant has challenged as excessive. That review shall
include, but is not limited to, the following factors:
(a) Whether the evidence presented or the
arguments of the attorneys resulted in one or more of the
following events in the determination of an award of
compensatory damages for noneconomic loss:
(i) It inflamed the passion or prejudice of the trier of
fact.
(ii) It resulted in the improper consideration of the
wealth of the defendant.
(iii) It resulted in the improper consideration of the
misconduct of the defendant so as to punish the defendant
improperly or in circumvention of the limitation on punitive
or exemplary damages as provided in section 2315.21 of the
Revised Code.

_______________________________________________________
190
See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1092-93. The only difference between the prior invalid cap and the
current one is that the multiple for awards that could exceed the $1 million cap was $35,000 per year in
the old law, compared to $15,000 per year in the new one. Id. Presumably, this reflects a legislative
determination that the types of injuries denominated as noneconomic in nature have a lesser value today
than they did in 1996, when the previous cap was enacted. Such a determination appears irrational on its
face. Ironically, the previous cap was a reenactment of a yet earlier cap on noneconomic damages that
was also found unconstitutional. See id. at 1094-95. Unlike in other efforts, where the third time is the
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(b) Whether the verdict is in excess of verdicts
involving comparable injuries to similarly situated
plaintiffs;
(c) Whether there were any extraordinary
circumstances in the record to account for an award of
compensatory damages for noneconomic loss in excess of
what was granted by courts to similarly situated plaintiffs,
with consideration given to the type of injury, the severity
of the injury, and the plaintiff's age at the time of the injury.
(B) A trial court upholding an award of
compensatory damages for noneconomic loss that a party
has challenged as inadequate or excessive shall set forth in
writing its reasons for upholding the award.
(C) An appellate court shall use a de novo standard
of review when considering an appeal of an award of
compensatory damages for noneconomic loss on the
grounds that the award is inadequate or excessive.192
This section is designed to discourage excessive noneconomic
damages even after the damages have been reduced to comply with the cap.
After a defense objection to the amount of noneconomic damages awarded,
it requires the judge to determine whether the plaintiff’s closing arguments
inflamed the jury and led to the undue size of the award, to engage in a
comparative analysis of the award in relation to awards in other cases
involving comparable injuries for comparable plaintiffs, and to identify
extraordinary circumstances that can explain any departure from the norm
for comparable injuries. If, after undertaking such an analysis, the judge
finds no reason to reduce the award further, the judge must then – and only
then – draft written findings. No such findings are necessary if the judge
further reduces the award. Thus, for a judge seeking the path of least
resistance, even a modest reduction of the jury’s verdict will obviate the
need to write findings. Finally, the section authorizes de novo appellate
review of the final award.
1.

The Legislature Cannot Establish Criteria for
Reexamination of a Jury Verdict

_______________________________________________________
192
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The first requirement, scrutinizing whether the jury was inflamed,
went after a deep-pocket defendant, or sought to punish a defendant by
enlarging the compensatory award, generally does not require the judge to
do anything that is not part of existing excessiveness review already,193
though it turns that review on its head. Normally, a judge reviews an
allegedly excessive verdict to determine if a reasonable jury, reviewing the
evidence adduced, could have reached the conclusion of this jury.194 Ohio
precedent holds that a jury’s verdict is presumptively valid, unless the
contrary appears upon the record.195 Moreover, courts sustain a general
verdict unless it is clearly inconsistent with any theory relevant to the issues
before the court, as long as there is evidence to support the result.196
Amended Substitute Senate Bill 80 departs from this time-tested and
constitutionally compelled approach by mandating that the trial judge not
view the evidence as a whole from the perspective of the rational juror, but
from a specific set of legislatively selected issues in isolation from the other
evidence. The result undermines the jury’s role as trier of fact, while also
denigrating the judge’s control over the conduct of the trial.
In fact, the reexamination mandated by Section 1215.19, while
framed in traditional passion-and-prejudice language, misapprehends the
jury’s constitutional role. Under Ohio law, an excessive verdict caused by
passion and prejudice requires the trial court to grant a new trial,197 not to
substitute its judgment for that of the jury. An excessive verdict that is not
the product of passion or prejudice permits the court to reduce the verdict by
remittitur to an amount warranted by the evidence.198 Remittitur, however,
requires the consent of the plaintiff, otherwise a new jury trial must be
ordered.199 Critically, it is the plaintiff’s consent, and not the defendant’s,
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193

Ohio utilizes four criteria to determine whether to order a remittitur: (1) unliquidated damages were
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that is necessary.200
Any other approach, including Section 2315.19’s scheme, denies the
plaintiff the benefit of a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial. It authorizes a
trial court to “enter judgments in disregard of the jury’s verdict and thus
violate the plaintiff’s right to have all facts determined by the jury, including
damages.”201 In essence, Section 2315.19 makes the same error that the
Ohio Supreme Court condemned in Zoppo v. Homestead Insurance Co.202
There, the legislature reassigned responsibility for determining the amount
of punitive damages to the judge, when that determination had always been
within the jury’s exclusive province. The Court flatly declared that a law
that “impairs the traditional function of the jury in determining the
appropriate amount of damages . . . [and] voliates the right to trial by
jury.”203 The new statute similarly impairs that function by allowing the
judge to displace the jury’s determination.
It also invades the judicial authority of the trial judge. Broad
discretion in the conduct of trials is a universally-acknowledged, timehonored tradition that constitutes the essence of judicial power.204 The trial
judge, of course, is in the best position to determine whether the evidence
supports the verdict, regardless of whatever other evidence or improper
argument may have entered the courtroom and must determine whether any
prejudicial effect tainted the jury’s verdict.205 While the new statutory
provision permits a trial judge to make those determinations, it is infested
with suggestions that a lesser award is preferable by putting a laser-like
focus on a handful of factors that may not have had any discernible effect on
the overall results. Respect for the constitutional role of juries, however,
establishes that any preference should be weighted in favor of the jury’s
verdict. A trial judge’s understanding of the whole trial and determination
that the jury’s verdict is not against the weight of the evidence should have
the respect that is normally accorded through abuse of discretion review.
Section 2315.19 discards that respect by requiring written justification only
if the trial judge upholds the verdict and then imposes de novo appellate
review. It abridges the authority that is inherently vested in a trial judge.
2.

Comparability Has No Role in Excessiveness Review of
Compensatory Damages

_______________________________________________________
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In adopting an approach that requires noneconomic damage awards
in similar cases be compared in order to determine excessiveness, the
legislation attempts to import the unsatisfactory template that the U.S.
Supreme Court has adopted for punitive damages206 and applies them to
compensatory damages. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,207 the
Court found that grossly excessive punitive damage awards violate the due
process rights of defendants. To determine whether such a gross violation
has occurred, the Court enunciated three criteria: 1) Is the punitive award
grossly excessive in light of the reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct?; 2) Is the disparity between the harm or potential harm to the
plaintiff and the amount of punitive damages excessive?; and 3) Is the
punitive award comparable to civil damages or punitive awards in similar
cases?208
The third Gore factor is a comparability test. While having some
validity in the federal punitive damages regime, where the jury’s
determination of damages is not binding at the federal level, it cannot be
valid at the state level where the jury-trial right attaches, particularly with
respect to any form of compensatory damages. The Gore factors were
employed for a singular due process purpose: to provide fair notice of the
punishment possible for the egregious misconduct subject to punitive
damages.209 Thus, the Court noted that “[e]lementary notions of fairness
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive
fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but
also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”210 The same
notions of fairness do not demand similar predictability in the types of
compensatory damages misconduct might entail. Instead, compensatory
damages must, as best as monetary damages can, make the victim whole.
That requires an individualized determination of damages based on facts
presented at trial.
It is beyond dispute that a defendant is liable for the “natural,
proximate and probable consequences” for any injury for which the
defendant was the proximate cause.211 Thus, for example, where a
defendant negligently injures a person, causing them to lose wages,
comparisons to assure some form of equity does not take place between two
similarly injured plaintiffs, when one earns minimum wage and the other
earns $250,000 a year. Each will be compensated according to their loss.

_______________________________________________________
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The same differences are inherent in the type and scope of
noneconomic loss each person suffers – even for similar injuries. The same
injuries can engender vastly different pain and suffering and vastly different
impact on life activities. And contrary to the implications of those
advocating comparability for noneconomic damages, economic damages
cannot be assessed with any greater certainty than noneconomic damages.212
They each require individualized determinations. As one commentator,
Professor JoEllen Lind, a critic of comparability analysis, put it:
[P]ain and suffering and emotional distress affect the most
unique aspects of our being and cannot in principle be
equated from case to case. Comparability review ignores this
difficulty.
It rests instead on a discredited form of
utilitarianism, one that treats the internal states of different
individuals as virtually the same. In this way, it flies in the
face of our intuitive sense of self and the law’s fundamental
assumption that separate persons are juridically basic
entities.213
She adds that “the actual process of comparing awards is so crude that it
increases the arbitrariness of damages,” rather than renders them more
consistent and predictable.214 Instead, it is the current method of
determining noneconomic damages that appears to “generally meet the
criteria of results produced through a legitimate, if less than perfect, decision
process.”215 Professor Lind then concludes that:
Comparability review allows federal appellate tribunals to
reconstitute themselves into legislators or technocrats under
the guise of promoting fairness, efficiency, and legitimacy.
But, none of these goals are actually promoted by the
practice.216
A related problem with comparability review is its discriminatory
impact on the verdicts given to women, minorities, children, and the elderly,
partially because these categories of plaintiffs either suffer from income
inequality or have no income at all, resulting in a heavier reliance upon
noneconomic damages to compensate them for their injuries. Perhaps the
most substantial research on the discriminatory impact of noneconomic

_______________________________________________________
212
See e.g. Frank A. Sloan et al., Suing for Medical Malpractice (U. Chi. Press 1993); Randall Bovbjerg
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damage caps has focused on its effect on women claimants. Comparability
analysis suffers the same discriminatory-impact flaw. Recent scholarship by
Professor Lucinda Finley examined the issue in the context of California’s
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act,217 which limits noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases to $250,000. Using California jury
verdict reporters, Professor Finley examined jury verdicts in medical
malpractice cases from 1992 to 2002 in which plaintiffs prevailed and were
awarded damages in excess of the cap.218 She found that “women’s pre-cap
median jury award was 94% of the men’s median,” and “women’s [postcap] median was down to 58.6% of the male median.”219 She also
discovered that the average compensatory awards to male plaintiffs were
significantly higher than the awards to female plaintiffs even before the
$250,000 noneconomic damage cap applies.220 Women on average
recovered only “52% of men’s average awards.”221 After application of the
cap, the disparities in awards increased noticeably: “women on average
recovered only 45% of men’s average recoveries.”222 Even greater gender
disparities were found in medical negligence cases that resulted in death.
Post-cap, the female median recovery was only 71.3% of the male median,
and women’s average recovery was 51.7% of the average male.223
Other researchers found similar results in other jurisdictions. Two
found that in the 21 states that capped noneconomic damages at the time,
women in medical malpractice actions:
were almost three times more likely to include a pain and
suffering component as those given to men. The typical
pain and suffering verdict awarded to a female in our
sample was twice as large as that given to a male. The
median pain and suffering award for the ninety-six women
who received this form of redress was exactly $100,000,
while the median for the thirty-three men was $50,000.224
They determined that women received a disproportionate number of
noneconomic damages awards because of the gendered nature of injuries.
For example,
[n]early nine out of every ten victims of sexual abuse by
medical providers were female. The only compensable

_______________________________________________________
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injury in most of these sexual abuse cases was emotional
“pain and suffering.” Elderly women in nursing home cases
generally receive only noneconomic damages because they
have no present or future earnings to lose. Most housewife
victims of incompetent cosmetic surgery have few direct
economic losses. Pain and suffering, mental anguish, and
loss of consortium are disparately awarded to women in
order to reimburse for reproductive injuries. Verdicts
compensating for the emotional distress caused by the fear
of possible future disability from breast implants or
permanent disfigurement from the removal of implants
typically include little in economic damages.225
Professor Finley further notes:
Several types of injuries that are disproportionately suffered
by women – sexual assault, reproductive harm, such as
pregnancy loss or infertility, and gynecological medical
malpractice – do not affect women in primarily economic
terms. Rather, the impact is felt more in the ways
compensated through noneconomic loss damages:
emotional distress and grief, altered sense of self and social
adjustment, impaired relationships, or impaired physical
capacities, such as reproduction, that are not directly
involved in market based wage earning activity. Many of
these most precious, indeed priceless, aspects of human life
are virtually worthless in the market, and there is social
resistance to seeing them solely or primarily in
commodified, market-based terms.226
The inescapable conclusion from this research is that noneconomic
damages uniquely and disproportionately compensate women for losses that
they alone suffer and constitute a larger proportion of their compensatory
damages. The same injuries affect women differently from men and
differently from one another. Comparability analysis would compound the
discriminatory effects that are inherent in noneconomic damage caps.
The same income inequalities that drive the discriminatory impact
on gender also fuel the discriminatory effects of caps on the basis of race. It
cannot be gainsaid that such racial income inequalities exist.227 Thus, as
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with women, noneconomic damages make up a higher percentage of racial
minorities’ compensatory awards than those whose incomes are higher.
The income disparity that exists for minorities is compounded by
differences in the quality and availability of health care. The Institute of
Medicine at the National Academy of Sciences published a 2002 report that
found that sophisticated diagnostic tests and treatments were less likely to be
utilized in facilities serving minority populations than those serving nonminorities, while less desirable procedures were more frequently
employed.228 Similarly, the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality found racial and ethnic minorities less likely to receive appropriate
cancer, cardiac, diabetes, pediatric, or surgical care.229
These disparities may explain the findings of Harvard University
researchers that incidents of adverse events and medical errors are more
pronounced in hospitals that serve predominantly minority populations.230
Thus, capping noneconomic damages not only undermines the deterrent
effect of malpractice accountability, but also has a clear and decidedly
adverse impact on minorities and their comparative recoveries for
negligently received medical injuries.
Other segments of the population are also adversely affected.
Because the elderly often live on fixed and limited incomes and children
generally do not have income of any substantial kind, income disparities
also account for the discriminatory effect damage caps or comparability
analyses have on these categories of claimants. For example, with respect to
the elderly, age sixty-five or older, Professor Finley reported that, on
average, noneconomic damages for elderly female patients in medical
negligence cases that did not result in death were reduced an average of
31.7% by a cap of $250,000.231 The median recovery for elderly women
after application of the cap was 53.7% of the pre-capped amount; the
recovery for elderly men was 72.8% of the pre-cap median.232
A cap’s disparate impact on youth is also glaringly evident. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court recently observed that “[y]oung people are most
affected by the [state’s] $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages, not only
because they suffer a disproportionate share of serious injuries from medical
malpractice, but also because many can expect to be affected by their
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injuries over a sixty- or seventy-year life expectancy.”233 Similarly, a 1992
report by the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance found that children
from ages zero to two with medical malpractice injuries comprise less than
ten percent of all malpractice claims, yet their claims comprise a
disproportionately large portion of the paid claims due to the severity of
their injuries.234 Thus, “plaintiffs with the most severe injuries appear to be
at the highest risk for inadequate compensation. Hence, the worst-off may
suffer a kind of ‘double jeopardy’ under caps.”235
Perhaps even greater inequities are created by the cap in cases
where an infant or child has died as a result of malpractice. Professor
Finley’s research found that an eighty percent reduction was experienced by
families of dead babies and children or a seventy-nine percent reduction in
the median award.236 The cap also limited access to justice because the cap
created a disincentive to expend the necessary resources in expert witness
fees, depositions, and time to prosecute these complex cases, even though
the injuries were among the most serious one could suffer, rendering the cap
a form of triple jeopardy.237
Rather than alleviate disparities, comparability analysis will
exacerbate them because of inherent disparities in the manner in which
noneconomic damages compensate different people in different
demographic categories, as well as within those categories.
Finally, comparability analysis also suffers the same flaw that the
legislation’s caps regime does: it disparages the jury’s role and
determinations and subjects their verdict to unconstitutional revision.
3.

De Novo Review of Compensatory Damages Violates the
Right to a Jury Trial

Section 2315.19 compounds its constitutional error by providing for
de novo appellate review of the damage award. The provision is obviously
patterned after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Cooper Industries, Inc.
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.238 Cooper held that federal district court
assessments of punitive damage awards for excessiveness were subject to de
novo, rather than abuse of discretion, appellate review.239 Examining the
three Gore factors, as well as whether a trial or appellate court might be in a
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better position to make those determinations, the Cooper Court found that
“[c]onsiderations of institutional competence therefore fail to tip the balance
in favor of deferential appellate review.”240 In reaching that decision, the
Court overturned more than a century of jurisprudence that had recognized
punitive damages fell within the jury’s authority to assess. In 1851, the
Court had called it a “well-established principle of the common law” that:
In many civil actions . . . the damages assessed depend on
the circumstances, showing the degree of moral turpitude or
atrocity of the defendant's conduct, and may properly be
termed exemplary or vindictive rather than compensatory . .
. . This has been always left to the discretion of the jury, as
the degree of punishment to be thus inflicted must depend
on the peculiar circumstances of each case.241
Based on its venerable nature, the Court subsequently concluded, both in
1886 and 1983, that the assessment of punitive damages was “the peculiar
function of the jury.”242
The Cooper Court, however, came to a different conclusion. First,
it decided that the discretion accorded juries in assessing punitive damages
did not mean that the punitive verdict was a fact within the jury’s
preeminent authority to find,243 but instead merely an expression of the
community’s “moral condemnation.”244 As if not convinced of its own
argument, however, the Court added: “In any event, punitive damages have
evolved somewhat.”245 The Court found that punitive damages once
performed a compensatory function that has now been supplanted by new
forms of damages, tacitly including noneconomic damages.246 Because
punitive damages had “evolved” and no longer performed a compensatory
function,247 the Court held that a different analysis applied that permitted the
judge and appellate court a larger role. The Court also viewed punitive
damages as quasi-criminal, thereby treating non-jury authority over the size
of the awards as comparable to that maintained over criminal sentencing.248
De novo review of punitive awards is only possible under Cooper
because the Court determined, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that
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the right to a jury trial does not include the assessment of punitive damages.
States, applying their independent constitutional jury-trial guarantee, need
not follow in lockstep with the Supreme Court’s approach.249 Ohio, for
example, has not retreated from its longstanding precedent that gives the
jury dominion over the assessment of punitive damages.250
Still, the U.S. Supreme Court never suggested that de novo review
of noneconomic damages could be undertaken, consistent with the Seventh
Amendment. Instead, the Court took pains to establish the opposite
proposition. Adopting Justice Scalia’s dissenting view in Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc.,251 that “the level of punitive damages is not
really a ‘fact’ ‘tried’ by the jury,”252 the Court contrasted that with “the
measure of actual damages suffered, which presents a question of historical
or predictive fact . . . .”253 The Court identified two different distinct
purposes served by compensatory and punitive damages:
The former are intended to redress the concrete loss that the
plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful
conduct . . . . The latter, which have been described as
“quasi-criminal,” operate as “private fines” intended to
punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing. A
jury’s assessment of the extent of a plaintiff’s injury is
essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition
of punitive damages is an expression of its moral
condemnation.254
The Court concluded that only “[b]ecause the jury’s award of
punitive damages does not constitute a finding of ‘fact,’ [de novo] appellate
review of the District Court’s determination that an award is consistent with
due process does not implicate . . . Seventh Amendment concerns . . .”255 To
demonstrate even further solicitude for the jury’s constitutional role, the
Court found that “nothing in our decision today suggests that the Seventh
Amendment would permit a court, in reviewing a punitive damages award,
to disregard such jury findings,” that established facts that support the size
of the punitive damage award.256 Such jury findings supporting the award
could be established through special interrogatories.257
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The same respect that the Supreme Court accorded for the jury’s
constitutionally assigned fact-finding role is not found in Amended
Substitute Senate Bill 80. By authorizing de novo appellate review of
noneconomic damages, the statute authorizes an appellate court to reweigh
the evidence and substitute its factual determinations for that of the jury. It
repeats the erroneous approach to appellate review that acting Governor
Colden asserted in Forsey v. Cunningham, from which even royal
prerogative retreated.258 It is black-letter law in Ohio that evidence must be
viewed by an appellate court consistently with the verdict and the judgment,
if it is at all capable of such a view.259 Reviewing courts are properly
reluctant to disturb a verdict where discretion is the touchstone of that
verdict, even if the appeals judges would have reached a different, lesser
verdict.260 The statutory endorsement of de novo review upends this
tradition, despite its grounding in the constitutional right to a jury trial.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Ohio’s latest versions of noneconomic damage caps, including its
attempt to institute comparability analysis and de novo appellate review,
breaks no new ground and should receive the same fate as its predecessors:
invalidation. As with all previous damage caps rejected by the Ohio courts,
it attempts to displace the jury’s constitutional role to assess damages with a
legislative judgment and seeks to make the judiciary the legislature’s
accomplice in the task. The exercise of judicial power by the legislature in
this fashion is nothing less than donning the mantle of super-judiciary, a role
that separation of powers was designed to foreclose. Fortunately, the Ohio
Constitution and a wealth of precedents provide an emphatic rebuttal to this
ill-considered scheme.

_______________________________________________________
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See supra nn. 110-31 and accompanying text.
Stokes v. Meimaris, 675 N.E.2d 1289 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. 1996).
260
See Knutzen Motor Trucking Co. v. Steiner, 166 N.E. 243 (Ohio App. 5th Dist. 1929).
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